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China’s unique approach to organizing industrial production has
provoked a whole spectrum of reactions among Western observers. The
recurrent attempts to alter the social division of labor and its associated
power and authority relations are viewed at one end of this spectrum as
quixotic, counterproductive skirmishes with the dictates of an invariant
social process of modernization (Lewis, 1969; Lowenthal, 1970). These
same attempts at directed change are viewed, at the other pole, not only
as an effective means to motivate workers, but also as a coherent, work-
able method of creating patterns of social life quite different from those
characteristic of industrial capitalism (Andors, 1969, 1977a; Hoffmann,
1974; Riskin, 1975a).
The contention between these views has led to direct confrontation
with some of the most enduringly difficult issues in Western social sci-
ence. The underlying problem is as perplexing as it is intriguing: how
does one distinguish the peculiar characteristics of capitalism from
those intrinsic to industrialized societies in general? The specific ques-
tion raised by the unique approach to organizing socialist production
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pursued in China over the past two decades is directly related to this
broader theoretical problem. To what extent are power and authority
relations within an enterprise regulated by inherent characteristics of
large-scale industrial production, and to what extent are they regulated
by the specific class nature and economic structure of society? (Giddens,
1971: 228-241, 1975: 138-143)
The clearest contrast between these two alternative perspectives is
still found in the original historical analyses of the genesis of capitalist
production performed by Karl Marx and Max Weber. Marx saw that
capitalism was a historically limited social form of commodity produc-
tion based on the undisguised exploitation of labor: the extraction of
surplus-value from the labor of formaHy free workers. Its emergence in
Europe from earlier feudal forms was based on the creation of a work
force expropriated of its independent means of livelihood, on the
development of large-scale commodity markets oriented towards ex-
change values, and on the appearance of private capital motivated
towards continuous self-expansion. Authority and power relations
within the capitalist enterprise, as well as class relations in society at
large, were determined by the underlying property relations of this
system. Workers whose only resource was the sale of their labor power
as a commodity were disadvantaged in a market oversupplied with labor
and dominated by owners of private capital (Marx, 1967: 877-886, 1973:
83-111).
Marx concluded that the abolition of private property would create
the single most important condition for undermining this social form.
With the abolition of private property would be eroded the rationale for
commodity production and the system of class domination based on
commodity markets and the unequal distribution of property. Author-
ity and power relations within the enterprise, by implication, would
change along with the surrounding class system (Marx, 1967: 814-820;
Giddens, 1971: 228-230).
While Weber also saw that capitalism was a historically limited social
form, he disagreed with Marx’s conclusion that power and authority
relations could be very different in a socialist economy. Capitalist ex-
ploitation, Weber felt, was only a specific form of a process of appropri-
ation of surplus common to all economies, including socialist ones.
What marked capitalism from earlier economic forms was its wide-
spread expropriation of workers from means of production and simul-
taneously from means of administration (Weber, 1964: 246-250).
Capitalism, further, with the widespread development of money econo-
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mies, formally free labor, and commodity markets, created both the pre-
conditions and incentives for a rational calculation of profit and
for growth on an historically unprecedented scale.
This high level of formal economic rationality, Weber argued, which
so colored authority relations between superiors and subordinates in
capitalist enterprise, would be a feature common to socialist economies.
For Weber, the expropriation of private property did not necessarily
return the means of production and of administration to workers. On
the contrary, in any &dquo;rationally organized socialistic economy,&dquo; &dquo;The
expropriation of all the workers would be retained and merely brought
to completion by the expropriation of private owners&dquo; (Weber, 1964:
248). This continued separation of authority from the masses of workers
is due to the fact that a socialist enterprise is still a &dquo;profit-making&dquo;
enterprise, in the sense that it must still rationally calculate money
surpluses and money costs (Weber, 1964: 190-191). Such rational calcu-
lation would still be necessary because in a planned economy &dquo;it is never
possible for subjective needs to correspond directly to effective demand&dquo;
(Weber, 1964: 194). If anything, Weber argued, socializing a capitalist
economy would only hasten this process of bureaucratization, because
considerable economic coordination formerly achieved through mar-
kets and prices would have to become the object of rational, calculative
planning. Where Marx, in short, saw features of authority relations as
specific to a system of class domination, Weber saw an irreversible
historical process of rationalization relatively insensitive to changes in
class structure I
These are issues of seemingly inexhaustible complexity. An accept-
able theoretical solution has eluded scholars since the beginnings of
industrial capitalism raised such issues and put them at the center of
the emerging disciplines of modern social science (Giddens, 1971). But
concerned as they are with the extent to which existing social arrange-
ments are determined by processes beyond the sphere of conscious
human intervention, these theoretical issues also have undeniable politi-
cal implications. Since political orientations towards existing structures
of power and authority are intimately related with , one’s theoretical
understanding of the viability of different structures, political senti-
ments have more than once in history been intermingled with social
theory.2 English Methodism’s sanctification of submission and moral
condemnation of idleness, for example, served simultaneously to disci-
pline industrial workers and to reconcile them to their new regime, often
at the conscious urgings of political economists and mill owners (Pol-
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lard, 1965: 192-208; Tawney, 1926: 253-273; Thompson, 1966: 355-362;
Weber, 1958: 60-77, 199). Specific secular conceptions of human abili-
ties and motivation, further, served the same purpose at a later stage of
industrial growth (Bendix, 1956; Braverman, 1974). Bendix argues that
these ideas, eventually incorporated into managerial and other social
theories, served as &dquo;ideological defenses of the position of industrial
elites&dquo; in the course of industrialization (Bendix, 1956: 2-13).
Given this historical perspective, one should be doubly sensitive to
the possible intrusion of political sentiments into social theories. For
this reason, we cannot dismiss lightly the criticism that the application
of western development theories to the study of China suffers from the
intrusion of biases rooted in America’s social structure and counter-
revolutionary world role (Andors, 1969, 1977a: 3-23; Peck, 1975). While
such critiques do little to sort out competing theoretical claims,3 they do
help nourish a healthy sense of skepticism that demands detached
examination of assumptions many of us have learned to take for grant-
ed.
INDUSTRIAL RELA TIONS IN CHINESE
MARXIST THEORY
The theoretical rationale behind the distinctive organizational ex-
periments at issue here-and thus the self-conception of the Chinese of
what they are attempting-has been only partially understood in the
West.4 This understanding has been heavily mediated by the distinctive
concerns of Western radical and liberal political theory. One popular
interpretation traces the Chinese concern with altering the social divi-
sion of labor to Marx’s concept of alienation. The Marxist impulse to
eliminate human alienation, in this view, commit the Chinese to eradi-
cating the dehumanizing aspects of industrial work responsible for
worker dissatisfactions and antagonisms-a strategy that will propel
industrial growth by tapping powerful hidden sources of human motiva-
tion (Andors, 1969; 395, 400; Hoffmann, 1974: 23-27).
The emphasis this interpretation places on individual feelings-the
subjective aspects of alienation so emphasized in the West-is reflected
neither in the importance attributed to alienation in Chinese Marxist
discourse nor in the dominant interpretation the Chinese place on
Marx’s original concept. Not only is the term &dquo;alienation&dquo; rarely in-
voked in theoretical discourse, but the terms commonly used to trans-
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late it-yihua, waihua, waizaihua, and shuyuanhua-emphasize only
the objective separation of the worker from both the mental aspects of
production and the product itself (Munro, 1974). Because alienation,
when rarely invoked in China, does not connote subjective feelings, a
commitment to reduce alienation in the sense of worker dissatisfaction
cannot serve as the source of Chinese efforts to transform work organi-
zation. The objective mental-manual split in the production process, as
we will explain shortly, does have a central place in the Chinese Marxist
emphasis on transforming the social relations of production, but this
does not take the form of a moral commitment to reduce dehumanizing
aspects of industrial labor.
A second popular, but no less misleading interpretation, stresses the
importance of worker participation in decision-making as a check upon
managerial power-a central element of a strategy to prevent the emer-
gence of a new bureaucratic class of administrators who exhibit in-
creasingly &dquo;capitalistic&dquo; values and behavior. The Chinese, according to
this view, aim to create transitional institutions where worker partici-
pation in decisions is integrated into a system of &dquo;checks and balances&dquo;
(Brugger, 1976: 215-252; Nee, 1975). This distinctly Madisonian inter-
pretation projects onto Chinese Marxism the faith in procedural demo-
cracy and formal institutions that distinguishes the liberal West. Worker
participation in managerial decisions has constituted an important con-
cern in China, but a liberal gloss places it in an entirely different light
than that reflected in the discussions of the Chinese themselves.
The theoretical source for this concern with transforming the work
process stems not from a moral commitment to reduce worker aliena-
tion or from an explicit conception of formal institutionalized checks
upon elite power, but from the application of the concept &dquo;mode of
production&dquo; to the analysis of socialist society. In a Marxian conception
of society a mode of production is a &dquo;totality&dquo; of property, exchange,
and distribution relations, to which corresponds a set of production rela-
tions distinctive to that mode (Marx, 1904: 11-12). Understood by Marx
as the direct relationship between different social groups in the produc-
tion process, production relations form the very core of social structure,
and are the basis of forms of political and economic domination.
The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus-labour is
pumped out of direct producers, determines the relationship of
rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of production itself and, in
turn, reacts upon it as a determining element. Upon this, however,
238
is founded the entire formation of the economic community which
grows up out of the production relations themselves, thereby
simultaneously its specific political form. It is always the direct
relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the
direct producers-a relation always naturally corresponding to a
definite stage in the development of the methods of labour and
thereby its social productivity-which reveals the innermost
secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure, and with it
the political form of the relation of sovereignty and dependence, in
short, the corresponding specific form of the state [Marx, 1967:
791].
According to Mao Ze-dong and those theorists who have been closely
aligned with him, the transformation of production relations in a
socialist society should not stop with the transformation of property
relations and those distribution relations most immediately linked to
private property (Bettelheim, 1974: 67-103; Mao, 1961-1962). Instead,
in order to transform &dquo;the entire formation of the economic com-
munity&dquo; and thus the forms of domination within it, continual changes
must be effected in distribution and power and authority relations
(Walder, 1977: 148-157). Failure to push these changes will have, in this
view, at least three serious repercussions. First, it will be impossible
to sustain attitudinal and behavioral changes necessary for the opera-
tion of a fully socialist society; second, production will be &dquo;fettered&dquo; by
the persistence of unreformed &dquo;irrational&dquo; production rules and regula-
tions, and by the continuing calculative involvement of workers; and
third, managerial and administrative personnel may use this untrans-
formed authority and power to consolidate their positions and become
an entrenched elite, slowing and perhaps even reversing the desired
process of social change (Mao, 1961-1962: 347-348, 385-386; Zhang,
1975).
This theoretical perspective has direct implications for industrial
organization. Since industrial organization embodies power and au-
thority aspects of production relations-or, as the Chinese put it, &dquo;rela-
tions between people in the midst of productive labor&dquo; [ren yu ren zai
shengchan laodong zhong de guanxt’J-Mao concluded that
After the question of the system of ownership has been resolved,
the most important question is that of management-that is, the
question of how to manage an enterprise under ownership of all
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the people or under collective ownership. This is also a question of
relations between people under a specific system of ownership....
Within a specific period there are always limits on changes in the
system of ownership, but within this same period it is possible to
change without interruption the relations between people in the
midst of productive labor. [Mao, 1961-1962: 386]
Because the transformation of social relations in the work process was,
in his estimation, both centrally important and entirely possible under
socialist conditions, organizational experiments, Mao continued,
would be performed in Chinese industry.
In enterprises under the ownership of all the people, we have
adopted such models as the integration of centralized leadership
with mass movements, the integration of Party leadership with the
worker masses and technicians, cadre participation in labor,
worker participation in management, and continuous changes in
irrational systems of rules and regulations. [Mao, 1961-1962: 386]
These measures summarize the distinctive Chinese approach to in-
dustrial organization. The elements Mao outlines here: use of di-
rected campaigns to create pressure for change, the cooperative
handling of technical, leadership, and operative tasks, the blurring of
distinctions between mental and manual labor, and repeated reform of
organizational procedures, are the concrete steps through which the
Chinese have attempted at irregular intervals to transform the relations
between people in the midst of productive labor. Combined with at-
tempted changes in distribution relations-restricting wage differentials
and extending cooperative and nonmaterial incentives-these organiza-
tional experiments form a conscious effort to transform the production
relations of socialist society. By transforming these work relations the
Chinese have hoped gradually to erode the basis of political and eco-
nomic domination of one social group over another.
LIMITS ON DIRECTED ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
At issue is the extent to which these principles can provide a workable
basis for industrial organization in a rapidly developing society. This
issue has most often been approached by trying to determine the degree
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of success with which these changes have been implemented and, if less
than successful, by attempting to uncover those factors that restricted
their success. Because these organizational experiments have been im-
plemented irregularly and appear to be difficult to maintain in their
initial form for a sustained period of time (Andors, 1974b, 1977a), atten-
tion in the field has focused on explaining this irregular pattern of imple-
mentation. Each explanation of this irregular pattern carries an implicit
or explicit statement of those crucial factors that hamper the operation
of these new forms of organization.
The explanations forwarded for this irregular pattern fall into two
broad groups. These groups are distinguished by the extent to which
they attribute difficulties in implementing organizational change in
China either to such nonstructural factors as human motivation and
behavior, or to structural characteristics demanded of individual organi-
zations in industrial societies: the complexity of technology, the degree
of specialization necessary in large-scale organizations, and so forth.
With few exceptions, scholars heavily emphasize either human motiva-
tion and behavior (nonstructural factors) or formal organizational
characteristics (structural factors) in their analyses of attempted organi-
zational change in Chinese industry.
The classic nonstructural analysis of organization in China, Schur-
mann’s Ideology and Organization in Communist China ( 1968), is the
only nonstructural perspective not to specify human action or worker
motivation as a key factor. For Schurmann, the alternating emphasis
and deemphasis on organizational change is in large measure a product
of the dialectical world view of Chinese Communist elites. The concept
of &dquo;contradictions&dquo; which suffuses this ideology requires shifting pat-
terns of action as a contradiction sharpens and demands reconciliation
(Schurmann, 1961, 1968: 73-104). Because ideology, for Schurmann, is
a &dquo;manner of thinking characteristic of an organization,&dquo; and because
organization is &dquo;a rational instrument engineered to do a job&dquo; (Schur-
mann, 1968: 8-9), it fallows that this systematic set of abstract ideas has
real consequences for the action and purpose of Chinese organizations.
The expansion and contraction of mass campaigns to implement change
is, thus, an example of &dquo;ideology in action.&dquo; The dialectical world view,
when translated into a &dquo;practical ideology&dquo; that faces &dquo;concrete prob-
lems,&dquo; results in a unique, erratic form of organizational behavior (1968:
74).
Schurmann’s account of those concrete problems that face organiza-
tional efforts in industry, unfortunately, is not so well developed as his
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elegant conception of ideology and organization. His own account of
industrial management during the 1950s insightfully relates the alterna-
tive &dquo;human&dquo; and &dquo;technical&dquo; orientations to management considered
by Chinese elites to the important themes in western organizational liter-
ature, but the discussion of the concrete problems that constrain the
implementation of one or the other of these approaches forms only an
occasional backdrop to an otherwise enlightening discussion (Schur-
mann, 1968: 220-239, 278-307). Concerned largely with demonstrating
the relevance of his perspective on ideology and organization to differ-
ent sectors of Chinese society, Schurmann leaves to other scholars the
task of systematically investigating those concrete problems constrain-
ing one or another organizational approach in industry.
Andors’ various writings (1969, 1974b, 1977a) are in many ways an
attempt to build upon Schurmann’s pioneering work by extending the
focus to include the 1960s and 1970s, and by more carefully investigat-
ing the concrete problems that exist. Andors, in fact, keeps some of
Schurmann’s key analytical distinctions-&dquo;policy/ operations,&dquo; for
example (Andors, 1969: 396; Schurmann, 1968: 223-225)-and Andors’
interest in alternative &dquo;human&dquo; conceptions of management, where
organizational procedures are less specialized and formalized, finds its
roots in Schurmann’s original explorations of these themes (Schur-
mann, 1968: 225-239). Where Andors gains by jettisoning the ideology-
organization perspective that prevented Schurmann from more closely
investigating concrete organizational problems, he loses the sustained
analytical focus that Schurmann’s own perspective afforded him. His
explanations are, as a consequence, offered in an unsystematic, often ad
hoc fashion, without an underlying theoretical framework to order a
variety of concrete problems and render them coherent.
As are Schurmann’s, Andors’ explanations are primarily nonstruc-
tural. Using political and historical factors as explanatory devices,
Andors rejects technological and other structural factors which smack
of &dquo;convergence&dquo; or other perspectives emphasizing the necessary struc-
tural similarity of all modern societies (Andors, 1969, 1977a: 3-23; 243).
In what amounts to an interpretive history of management policy in
Chinese industry, he introduces a wide variety of concrete problems in-
tended to explain particular shifts in policy orientation-conflict be-
tween individuals with varying skill and educational levels, class
backgrounds, and thus, political orientations towards change; policy
conflicts among top Party leaders; and the sheer enormity and com-
plexity of the task of large-scale change. Clearly implicit in this account
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is the crucial nature of human motivation, attitudes, and political ac-
tion. One derives the impression that if only the political struggles over
management and the problems due to the complexity of implementation
eventually can be decisively resolved, and if the new system of manage-
ment can overcome the hostile attitudes towards it exhibited by leading
personnel, worker participation can act as a powerful source of pro-
ductivity and a basis for a new industrial order (1977a: 10-23, 241-
247). Irregular patterns of implementation reflect, for Andors, periodic
struggles against the dead weight of entrenched bureaucracy, political
opposition, and backward consciousness-constraining factors which
derive more from history than from technology (1977a: 243).
Skinner and Winckler (1969) were the first to explore in a complex
and systematic fashion the relation between these crucial nonstructural
factors and elite attempts at directed change. While their superb theoret-
ical extension of the basic organizational concepts of power and in-
volvement are intended explicitly to apply to rural social organization
in China, the concepts they use are part of a perspective designed to be
applicable to all complex organizations (Etzioni, 1975).5 For Skinner
and Winckler the concrete problem that accounts for irregular imple-
mentation of organizational change is the continual contradiction be-
tween shifting elite goals, the consequently shifting types of power
used by elites, and the changing basic-level responses to these types of
power by individuals in organizations. Their &dquo;compliance cycle&dquo; (Skin-
ner and Winckler, 1969: 419) for example, is set in motion when the poli-
tical leadership, concerned with maximizing ideological goals (social
change, for example), &dquo;radicalize&dquo; their &dquo;power mix&dquo; and emphasize
normative appeals over remunerative ones. These normative appeals
generate strong commitment from organizational members for a period,
but the effect of such appeals eventually wears off and they become inef-
fective-disappointment breeds alienation. To remedy this alienative
involvement, elites then must shift the emphasis in their power mix from
now-ineffectual normative appeals to forms of coercion. Coercion may
remedy the negative effects of alienation, but it results in &dquo;indifferent&dquo;
involvement which only yet another shift in power-this time to remu-
nerative incentives-can temporarily remedy. The cycle of attempted
organizational change thus complete, China’s organizations await the
next decision to radicalize-a decision itself touched off by this con-
tinual contradiction between goals, power, and basic-level involvement
(Skinner and Winckler, 1969: 411-420; Etzioni, 1975: 484-494). Skinner
and Winckler, in other words, succeed in both those areas where Schur-
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mann and Andors are weakest. They are, unlike Schurmann, able to en-
compass within their perspective the relation between elite intentions
and actions, on the one hand, and &dquo;concrete problems&dquo; (subordinate
responses) on the other. They set their &dquo;concrete problems,&dquo; further,
within the systematic explanatory framework which Andors’ various
accounts lack. Whether this theory adequately captures the important
concrete problems constraining organizational change in Chinese
industry is yet another issue.
A major challenge to the adequacy of a Skinner-Winckler compli-
ance framework for industry is posed by the more &dquo;structural&dquo; organi-
zational perspectives. These perspectives-often directly critical of the
Etzioni scheme upon which Skinner and Winckler draw-stress not
human motivation or responses to elite power as a key element in the
study of organizations, but rather the structures that must exist if an
organization is to operate with a particular physical technology or deal
with the characteristics of its immediate environment (Perrow, 1972;
Thompson, 1967). The direct implication structural perspectives have
for the study of organizational change in China is that relatively in-
variant organizational characteristics may prove to be an important
barrier to change in Chinese industry.
When linked to a vision of an invariant process of modernization,
such a perspective can spawn categorical claims about the inevitability
of increasing specialization and bureaucratization within organiza-
tions, and hence, a priori dismissals of the Chinese attempts to create
different forms of organization as inherently unworkable. Such are the
approaches used by Lewis (1969) and Lowenthal (1970). These essays
begin by assuming the validity of a once-popular view of the process of
development and its impact upon complex organizations-that &dquo;the
character of science and technology and the requirements inherent in
modern methods of production and distribution&dquo; demand increasing
specialization and large-scale, hierarchic organizations. This, so the
argument goes, is &dquo;intrinsic in the industrialization process&dquo; and consti-
tutes an immutable, if not unilinear, &dquo;logic of industrialism&dquo; (Kerr et al.,
1960: 33).
Armed with this implicit theoretical view, Lewis and Lowenthal set
out to examine the consequences of Chinese attempts to escape this
inescapable &dquo;logic.&dquo; Lewis argues that the periodic clash of &dquo;highly rigid
and doctrinaire ideologies&dquo; with the modernization process has resulted
in the disruption of the economy and of civil order, and has left the
masses severely alienated from Communist elites (Lewis, 1969: 33).
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Lowenthal, in a nearly identical fashion, asserts a basic contradiction
between the goals of &dquo;utopia&dquo; and &dquo;modernization&dquo; (1970: 51), and
concludes that in the recurrent clash of these two processes of social
change-one directed and conscious and the other the spontaneous re-
sult of modernization-the utopian impulse will inevitably succumb
(1970: 53-54). Organizational and other social experiments in China are
not sustained, in other words, because they are simply in direct conflict
with technological and other structural imperatives of modernization.
The problem with this perspective, of course, is that the resolution of
the issue in question-constraints on alternative forms of organiza-
tion-is assumed rather than argued. By invoking a global perspective
which they must presume to be unchallengeable, the authors bother
neither to develop a theoretical argument of their own, as do Schur-
mann and Skinner-Winckler, in a complex and rigorous way, nor to re-
late their arguments in a concrete manner, as does Andors, to observed
patterns of organization in China. The whole exercise hinges on the
acceptance of some exceedingly vague claims about social organization
derived from an altogether too brief and superficial discussion of a type
of developmental perspective that has, even in its more carefully stated
forms, drawn considerable criticism (Black, 1966: 47-50; Nisbet, 1969;
Smith, 1973; Tilly, 1975).
A structural perspective need not result in such a deterministic view
of organizations in the process of modernization. When armed with a
dose of skepticism about contemporary theories of development, it in
fact. can provide explanations for seemingly divergent patterns of
organization. This is precisely the approach used by Brugger (1976: 1-3)
in his study of the experience of Soviet forms of industrial organization
in China. Brugger found that two structural factors, among others,
inhibited the operation of Soviet &dquo;one-man management&dquo; and its attend-
ant responsibility and control systems. The operation of such a strict
hierarchical system of control required a variety of highly trained per-
sonnel that the Chinese did not possess, and such a rigid bureaucratic
structure needed a stable organizational environment that post-Libera-
tion China could not provide (Brugger, 1976: 253-263). China’s leaders,
searching for an organizational approach that was compatible with the
nation’s scarcity of resources and tenuous political and economic sta-
bility, began to turn towards the less formalized and hierarchical pat-
terns of organization developed in the base areas. Structural factors,
in other words, acted at least in the short run to push organizational
forms in a direction opposite that asserted in logic of industrialism
arguments.
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While this wide variety of structural and nonstructural approaches
has been used in studies of industrial organization in China, three
theoretical issues have preoccupied researchers over the past decade.
First is the question of what role human motivation plays in shaping
organizational alternatives-a question, in other words, about the im-
pact of changes in human behavior upon the structure and effectiveness
of organizations. Second is the question of what relative impact tech-
nology has upon the organization of work-a question, in other words,
about the limits placed by technology on the types of organizational
changes attempted in China. Finally, there is the question of what
demands the process of modernization will place upon the organization
of Chinese industry-a question, in other words, about the possible
long-run conflict between Chinese attempts at organizational change
and the structural demands of industrialized society. The pursuit of
these questions has led China specialists into the disciplinary litera-
ture on complex organizations.
HUMAN BEHA VIOR AND ORGANIZATION
Perhaps the most frequently read argument about Chinese industrial
management is that the increased worker participation in decision-
making it ideally embodies can act as a powerful source of motivation-
motivation that is transformed into industrial productivity (Andors,
1977b: xxiii-xxxi; Hoffmann, 1974: 110-122; Riskin, 1975a, 1975b).
Citing a well-known portion of the literature in industrial psychology
and management, proponents of this view draw striking parallels
between Chinese participative approaches to management and the
measures advocated by Western social scientists for building worker
motivation and effective industrial organization (Lawler, 1973; Vroom,
1964).
Riskin (1975a) has forwarded by far the most cogent presentation of
this argument. Criticizing authors who assume that excess &dquo;ideological
extremism&dquo; in the form of worker participation in decisions and non-
material incentives will damage productivity (Richman, 1969: xi), he
argues that there is a large body of theory and research pointing to the
effectiveness of the approach used in China. Not only is there evidence
that workers can be powerfully motivated by considerations other than
pay, but there are economists who have argued that such motivational
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inputs, a dimension often ignored in conventional microeconomic
analysis, can move levels of productive efficiency to entirely new planes
(Leibenstein, 1966). Riskin, in short, bases his rebuttal of critics of the
Chinese approach on the sheer weight of accumulated scholarly litera-
ture : &dquo;it has been almost axiomatic in literature on management that
providing workers with greater understanding of the significance of
their work and greater influence over its design and purpose would
stimulate productivity&dquo; (Riskin, 1975a: 446-447).
While for years this has indeed been almost axiomatic, a more critical
examination of recent organizational literature provides ample evidence
that this relationship between participative management and height-
ened worker productivity must be carefully qualified-and in ways
directly relevant to the study of Chinese attempts at organizational
change. The position about motivation and productivity referred to by
students of Chinese industry can be broken down into a logical chain:
participative work activity leads to satisfaction and heightened morale;
this morale creates additional motivation to work; and this added moti-
vation contributes, in turn, to rising productivity. Upon closer scrutiny,
each of the three links in this tight chain of logic are loosened by
several crucial qualifications or conditions.
The link between participation and morale, for example, is modified
by the recurring finding that individuals vary greatly in the way that they
respond to these more varied and demanding tasks (Hulin and Blood,
1968). In one study this variation was attributed to the influence of
community background: workers from urban communities derived far
less satisfaction from such varied tasks than did those from small rural
towns (Turner and Lawrence, 1965). Indeed, the distinct possibility
arises, as many researchers have found, that the demands of a varied
task may overwhelm the capabilities of some workers, just as repetitive,
fragmented tasks can frustrate others (Lawler, 1973: 158-170).
The link between high morale and motivation to work, further, must
be similarly qualified.. Workers satisfied with their job or with the net-
work of personal relations connected with it are not necessarily those
who are highly motivated to produce. Except for absenteeism and turn-
over, job satisfaction has been found to have, at best, a weak relation to
work motivation (Perrow, 1972: 107; Lawler, 1973: 84-87). While it
makes consummate sense that participation and satisfaction are closely
related to work motivation, their precise relations are exceedingly
complex, mediated as they are by a variety of individual and societal
factors (Perrow, 1972: 97-115; 119-143).6
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More importantly, even if we can assume, for the moment, that
Chinese efforts to involve workers in managerial decisions do lead
straightforwardly to heightened motivation, there is a strong tradition
within the field of complex organizations which argues that such moti-
vation can be translated into productivity only under certain conditions.
According to this view, a group of workers-no matter how highly moti-
vated-cannot perform effectively unless their efforts are organized in a
manner that fits the type of tasks in which they are engaged. The types
of participative measures employed in Chinese industry, therefore,
imply a specific organizational structure, and this structure, in turn,
would have to be fitted to varying concrete features of enterprises before
heightened motivation could lead to organizational effectiveness. Eval-
uation of the claims made about participation, motivation, and pro-
ductivity, in other words, must lead directly from an abstract discussion
of human motivation to an examination of the concrete setting in which
these measures must be carried out. Workers, in short, may indeed
derive motivation under certain conditions from participative manage-
ment, but organizing this motivated activity in a productive way may be
quite another task.’
TECHNOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION
The problem that arises at this point is, in a broad sense, that of the
relation between &dquo;technology,&dquo; or the actions that individuals perform
upon an object with the help of a whole variety of tools and machines,
and &dquo;organizational structure,&dquo; or the social relationships that exist
between individuals while engaged in this activity (Perrow, 1967: 195).
The relevant issue is what impact a pattern of productive actions, shaped
by existing technology, has upon the nature of managerial power or
worker discretion-and more specifically, what constraining influence
technology so defined will have upon an organization’s structure. If the
types of changes in structure advocated in China will conflict with
specific features of a given technology, a concrete problem may exist no
matter how much motivation workers may derive from these structures.
The relation between the nature of the physical task of an organiza-
tion, whether this be labelled in its various aspects technology or &dquo;en-
vironment,&dquo; and the structure of power, control, and authority in an
organization, has been a major preoccupation of recent organizational
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sociology. Stinchcombe (1959: 176-186) found, for example, that
specific features of Weber’s ideal type of bureaucracy were markedly
absent in the construction industry, whereas they were present in mass
production firms. This deviation from the classic bureaucratic type-a
type, incidentally, which conflicts with prescribed Chinese forms of
organization in crucial ways (Whyte, 1973: 157)-was due to specific
types of uncontrollable variability in the various stages of the construc-
tion task and in the natural environment in which construction takes
place (Stinchcombe, 1959: 179-180). Relatedly, Blauner (1964) des-
cribed the widely varying impact that technologies in craft, machine
tending, assembly-line, and automated industries have on worker con-
trol over their own activity and on their relations with others.
These basic insights stimulated a wide variety of approaches to
understanding the impact of an organization’s concrete task upon the
structures of activities within it. Burns and Stalker (1966) provide a
valuable, if over-simplified dichotomy of types of organizational struc-
tures that will greatly facilitate a brief navigation of this literature. The
contrast between the two &dquo;ideal types&dquo; of structures they investigated
correspond in a broad way with the contrasts often made between
features of Chinese industrial management and less participative forms
(Whyte, 1973; 1974a). The type of structure they termed &dquo;organic&dquo; is
reminiscent of the Chinese experiments. In such a form of organization
Individuals have to perform their special tasks in the light of their
knowledge of the tasks of the firm as a whole. Jobs lose much of
their formal definition in terms of methods, duties, and powers,
which have to be redefined continually by interaction with others
participating in a task. Interaction runs laterally as much as verti-
cally. Communication between people of different ranks tends to
resemble lateral consultation rather than vertical command.
Omniscience can no longer be imputed to the head of the concern.
[Burns and Stalker, 1966: 506]
This type of organizational structure, characteristic of participative
management, contrasts sharply with a structure tagged &dquo;mechanistic,&dquo;
where
the problems and tasks facing the concern as a whole are broken
down into specialisms. Each individual pursues his task as some-
thing distinct from the real tasks of the concern as a whole....
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&dquo;Somebody at the top&dquo; is responsible for seeing to its relevance.
The technical methods, duties, and powers attached to each func-
tional role are precisely defined.... Operations and working be-
havior are governed by instructions and decisions issued by
superiors.... Management, often visualized as the complex
hierarchy familiar in organizational charts, operates a simple con-
trol system, with information flowing up ... and decisions and
instructions flowing downward. [Burns and Stalker, 1966: 5]
The crucial question, directly relevant to Chinese attempts at organi-
zational change, is under what sets of conditions these two structures, or
variations thereof, are effective. Burns and Stalker themselves found
that organic or participative structures predominated where techno-
logical innovation was rapid and the market for products unstable-and
under opposite conditions, mechanistic structures predominated. Other
attempts to explore this problem have focused upon different concrete
conditions-environmental stability (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967;
Thompson, 1967), the routineness or nonroutineness of the task (Per-
row, 1967), the rate of technological change (Harvey, 1968), and differ-
ent features of the technological work process (Thompson, 1967; Wood-
ward, 1965). In each case, the predominance and effectiveness of differ-
ent aspects of organic and mechanistic structures varied according to
concrete technological and environmental conditions. Participatory
structures proved effective, generally speaking, in nonroutine or non-
predictable situations, while more mechanistic structures fared better
in routine and predictable technological and environmental conditions
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Woodward, 1965).
The direct implication for any attempt at large-scale organizational
change is that
to call for decentralization, representative bureaucracy, collegial
authority, or employee-centered, innovative or organic organiza-
tions-to mention only a few of the highly normative prescriptions
that are being offered by social scientists today-is to call for a
type of structure that can be realized only within a ’certain type of
technology, unless we are willing to pay a high cost in terms of
output.... It is increasingly recognized that there is no &dquo;one best&dquo;
theory (any more than there is &dquo;one best&dquo; organizational structure,
form of leadership, or whatever). [Perrow, 1967: 204]
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Since proponents of this view are careful to point out that this should
not be interpreted as a form of technological determinism,8 this perspec-
tive does nothing more than set forth some useful technological distinc-
tions that have demonstrated applicability in analyzing the effectiveness
of different forms of organization. Specific approaches to industrial
management, in brief, have exhibited varying levels of success under
different concrete conditions.
In light of this evidence, the emphasis placed on changes in worker
motivation in so many studies of Chinese industry appears to be mis-
placed, just as the common disregard for concrete enterprise conditions
glosses over a potentially serious problem. Even if we assume that parti-
cipation motivates workers in the most powerful of ways, we are still
faced with the distinct possibility that highly motivated workers will
be organized, under certain conditions, in highly ineffective ways. If one
were to derive a useful insight from the specialist literature on complex
organizations, therefore, it would not be the unqualified assertion
that participation can lead to heightened motivation and productivity.
On the contrary, this literature suggests a potential problem in the
Chinese approach-a large-scale administrative problem of tailoring
participative schemes to widely varying enterprise conditions. Such a
process of adjustment would have to be successfully carried out to reap
the potential benefits of participatory management, on the one hand,
and to avoid the costs of misapplication on the other.
This potential administrative problem, however, would not be merely
a mechanical one of achieving the optimum technical &dquo;fit&dquo; between
enterprise conditions and the degree and type of worker participation.
The actual process of administrative adjustment would be a source of
considerable conflict. At precisely which point &dquo;adjustments&dquo; in partici-
patory management do away with the very essence of the scheme has been
a source of intense political contention in China (Andors, 1974b). For
managerial and basic-level Party personnel, &dquo;tailoring&dquo; worker participa-
tion to meet conditions in their enterprise is a task fraught with dangers:
excessive alterations may bring later political censure. For workers, it has
been a central political issue in successive mass campaigns whether such
actions by administrators represent an unjustified intrusion on their
perogatives. This administrative perspective, therefore, would encom-
pass within a single framework the problems created by varying enter-
prise conditions, the process of adjustment that must occur to remedy
them, and the political conflicts that would necessarily occur through-
out the system-from top to bottom-in the course of making needed
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adjustments. The outcome of these conflicts, in turn, would have an
impact on the effectiveness of participatory management in China. An
approach based on only one slice of this complex reality-Skinner and
Winckler’s cycles of power and involvement, for example-would
abstract completely from these concrete organizational factors and
would thus possibly miss an important problem and inherent source of
conflict in the Chinese approach.
ORGANIZATION AND MODERNIZATION
If technology, broadly conceived, has this variable impact upon the
types of managerial changes attempted in China, a logical next question
is what the implications of industrial development and technological
change will be for these attempted organizational changes. Underlying
this question is the conceptual problem of what modern technology is,
how it changes during the process of industrialization, and what charac-
teristics it might increasingly demand of the social relations of work.
According to broadly influential functionalist schemes, the very
essence of modernization is the movement toward greater specialization
and differentiation (Levy, 1966; Parsons, 1971: 18-28; Smelser, 1968)-
trends in direct conflict with Chinese attempts to despecialize tasks and
to diffuse the power and authority of management. Differentiation of
the various aspects of social structure into more specialized units and
social roles, in this view, is a general adaptive process of all success-
fully evolving societies. The increasingly complex, densely integrated
structures that result are features necessary for the maintenance of
societal equilibrium and cohesion (Parsons, 1966: 18-24; Smelser, 1959:
7-47). Kerr and his associates (1960: 33) formulate this general scheme as
the logic of industrialism and extend it to &dquo;technology and the require-
ments inherent in modern methods of production,&dquo; implying that tech-
nology, as part of this general process of differentiation, itself becomes
more &dquo;complex,&dquo; and that industrial work thus must become more
specialized and power in industrial organizations mo’re differentiated.
These tenets form the central premise for the scenario sketched out by
Lewis (1969) and Lowenthal (1970)-the inevitable clash between
Chinese attempts at change and the inherent characteristics of moderni-
zation, with the consequent abandonment of irrational attempts to
change the unchangeable.9
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This view hinges in no small measure on the assertion that increasing
technological complexity dictates greater specialization and diminished
worker authority in industrial enterprises. The same assertion, in some-
what modified form, is also an integral part of a major attempt to sort
out the competing claims made in the ongoing debate over the compati-
bility of Maoism with modernization. In a careful effort to evaluate the
merits of what he sees as two extreme positions, Baum ( 1975) concludes
that, while the organizational forms prescribed by the Chinese are by no
means unambiguously irrational, the heightened motivation claimed for
Chinese approaches to management is not a general solution to the
problem of organization. Baum asserts that the proper perspective lies
somewhere between these two poles (Baum, 1975: 186-191).
Baum’s alternative, however, is in essence a judicious restatement,
in light of the literature on motivation cited by Riskin and others, of
some of the central premises of Kerr, Lewis, and Lowenthal. Where
previously, however, musings about the fate of participatory manage-
ment with rising levels of technology were stated in a vague, unsystem-
atic manner, Baum carefully outlines a &dquo;Maoist ideo-logic&dquo; and a con-
trasting &dquo;industrial techno-logic&dquo; which conflict at certain crucial
points. Central to this industrial techno-logic are the assertions that
( 1 ) The larger, more capital-intensive and technologically complex
the enterprise, the more numerous and clearcut will be the lines of
(vertical) occupational stratification and (horizontal) job special-
ization ; (2) The larger, more capital-intensive and technologically
complex the enterprise, the less meaningful input rank-and-file
workers will have in overall enterprise management. [Baum, 1975:
158-159]
Baum thus sees a linear, inverse relationship between technological
complexity and opportunities for worker participation in workplace
decisions. His conclusions are entirely consistent with these premises:
the prescribed changes in industrial organization may prove effective at
China’s present stage of industrial growth, but as growth proceeds,
increasing technological complexity gradually will create pressures to
restrict opportunities for participative management (Baum, 1975: 158-
186). While Baum sensibly refuses to assert an eventual outcome of this
contradiction, the central elements of the Lewis-Lowenthal view-the
conflict between complex technologies and participative management,
and thus, the sharpening long-run conflict between modernization and
attempted organizational changes-are accepted as central organiza-
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tional issues. Unlike his predecessors, however, Baum makes a careful
argument for his position, and his more flexible approach to the issues is
informed by an evidently careful weighing of arguments from a number
of different perspectives.
While this approach might seem to be an entirely reasonable
generalization from recent literature on technology and organizations,
and while the logical link between technological and organizational
complexity is intuitively appealing, Baum’s proposal is weakened by the
premise that increasing technological complexity creates pressures to
restrict participatory organizational forms. « Without this premise, the
commonly heard arguments about the long-run conflict of Chinese
approaches to organization and the technological requirements of
modernization are untenable.
The relations between technological complexity and organizational
structure are by no means straightforward. Woodward (1965), in fact,
found that the type of structure that Burns and Stalker (1966) termed
&dquo;organic,&dquo; and which parallels many features of the Chinese approach, is
more prevalent and more successful at the highest ranges of
technological complexity-in the continuous process industries
characterized by modern chemical and petroleum plants. &dquo;Mechanistic&dquo;
structures, the type most often identified with the presumed dictates of
modernization, were found to be prevalent and effective only at the
middle ranges of technology-mass production. The crucial distinction
between the two is that in the middle ranges of technology worker
activity is primarily that of machine tending, with very little, if any,
opportunity to regulate the speed and quality of work or make a number
of job-related decisions. At the higher ranges of technological
complexity, however, workers perform a whole variety of relatively
autonomous and skilled tasks in support of what is essentially a self-
contained, automatic production process. Technology, in other words,
influences structure not through its complexity but through specific
features of a variety of technological work processes (Woodward, 1965:
64-72). The result, seemingly paradoxical, is that organizational
structures at the highest levels of technological complexity most
resemble those at the lowest levels-in traditional craft production. The
initial discovery of this phenomenon, in fact, led some to the rather
utopian conclusion that, quite the opposite from &dquo;logic of industrialism&dquo;
arguments, mechanistic organizational forms will soon be obsolete in
industrial societies (Bennis, 1966; Burns and Stalker, 1966).
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The central premise of these approaches to the problem of
modernization in China, as a consequence, must be seriously qualified,
if not completely discounted. Despite its logical and intuitive
attractiveness, an attempt to draw parallels between the technological
complexity that accompanies modernization and increasing specializa-
tion and hierarchy does not withstand close empirical examination.
Continued adherence to such a perspective carries the very real danger
that any retreat from these organizational changes in China can appear
to confirm a theory for which no firm logical basis has been offered, and
for which no set of clear concepts linking technological change with
organizational structure has been formulated. The process of moderni-
zation logically and empirically does, to be sure, have a powerful impact
on forms of organization in industry. The technological factor relied on
in so many treatments of China, however, has proven to be too complex
to assert with any degree of confidence that its operation in the process
of modernization sets specific dictates that increasingly restrict possible
forms of organization in any given direction.
ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE
The perspectives we have evaluated to this point represent only one
thin slice of the complex reality that comprises organized social life. The
motivations of individuals and the characteristics of technology
discussed above are concepts completely abstracted from concrete social
settings. The links between these motivated individuals and their
occupational groups, political community, and social class are ob-
scured. The links between technology and the network of economic
and social relations through which it must make its impact felt, fur-
ther, are decisively severed. To restrict our vision to the physical charac-
teristics of individual organizations and the psychology of individuals
within them would be to handicap severely our efforts to understand
this aspect of society.
Fortunately, there is a rich tradition within sociology that stresses the
relations between an organization and the social structure which
envelops it. &dquo;Social structure&dquo; means here any stable characteristic of
the surrounding society (Stinchcombe, 1965). For Marx the most
relevant aspect of social structure was the pattern of relations between
social groups in the productive process, and the forms of class
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domination and conflict to which they gave rise. For Weber, the decisive
aspect of social structure was the historical development of money
economies, expropriated labor, and production based on rational
calculation. More recent writers have stressed the level of group conflict
taking place within a society’s organizations (Dahrendorf, 1959;
Litwak, 1961), and the institutionalization of political, economic, and
community interests which freeze organizations into set patterns
(Selznick, 1957, 1966; Gouldner, 1954). Organizations, in short, must be
understood not only through examining what goes on inside of them,
but also through examining their concrete relationships with the many
aspects of the societies that surround and permeate them.
Viewed from this broader perspective, the process of specialization
that accompanied the Industrial Revolution in England appears less the
product of inherent dictates of technology than of the broader social
structure in which industrialization took place. This was a rapid process
of social change that was accompanied by intense social conflict (Foster,
1974; Thompson, 1966). It was also a period of unrestrained competi-
tion between enterprises: competition that compelled early industrial-
ists to extend and consolidate their still-tenuous control over the
production process. This protracted process of conflict and consolida-
tion was one where authority relations were transformed into patterns
that are popularly associated with industrialism today (Pollard, 1965).
The impulse for increased technological specialization found its
source in the intense competition between firms. Given the social
conditions of early British capitalism, however, such technological
changes were advantageous to the industrialist for at least two distinct
reasons unrelated to economies of scale. First, technological
innovations, as Braverman (1974) has argued, usually implied a
specialization that degraded skill levels, thus widening the potential
labor supply and forcing down the cost of labor. Second, such tech-
nological change usually eliminated the cohesive and strike-prone
skilled workers who presented a formidable barrier to the consoli-
dation of the industrialists’ authority in the work process (Ham-
mond and Hammond, 1920). Sometimes these processes were the
result of conscious strategies by owners of capital. Spurred by a long
series of strikes during the 1830s, the local textile manufacturers of the
districts of Hyde and Dukinfield, for example, banded together and
commissioned a local machine works to develop an automatic mule that
would reduce their reliance upon such unruly labor (Engels, 1973: 259-
260). Andrew Ure, a prominent political economist of the period (and
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a source of profound irritation to Marx and Engels), praised the resulting
machine as &dquo;a creation destined to restore order among the industrious
classes&dquo; (Engels, 1973: 260).
The historical process in which workers’ authority over themselves
and their own work was decisively eroded, then, was spurred at least in
part by the specific features of the early capitalist social system and the
forms of conflict to which they gave rise. It is tantalizing to speculate on
the variety of shapes authority relations could take in an industrial
enterprise where those sociohistorical factors most salient to capitalist
industrialization in Britain were absent or greatly altered. In what
direction could workplace authority relations conceivably develop in a
situation where such intense interfirm competition and such direct
conflict between the interests of capital and labor are absent?
Reflections on this historical pattern have led many observers of
China to the conviction that a socialist economy creates conditions that
make possible radically different forms of workplace organization.
Andors, the most active proponent of this view, argues that the
underlying issue in China’s development is a leadership choice between
two different approaches to modernization. The first approach, similar
in important ways to that adopted in the Soviet Union, is to implement
careful central planning, strict economic accounting at all levels,
rationally stratified material work incentives, and tight labor discipline.
The second approach-the one favored during China’s heretofore
periodic mass campaigns-is to decentralize economic planning,
deemphasize enterprise level accounting and profit criteria in favor of
fulfilling output targets for local needs, and emphasize participative
work incentives and cooperative decision-making in production.
Andors sees the first approach as leading inevitably to forms of
industrial organization similar to those of Western capitalism, while the
second will create economic conditions making possible the
transcendence of these earlier social forms (Andors, 1969, 1974a). As the
second approach is gradually implemented-thus creating forms of
economic life compatible with participative forms of organization-
constraints on experimental organizational forms will no longer be
systemic in nature. Instead, they will primarily be the persistent political
opposition presented at various levels of State and Party administration
and the short-term complexities inherent in carrying out such ambitious
experiments (Andors, 1977a).
Here we return to the central issues enumerated at the outset of this
essay, albeit with a slight twist of emphasis. Are there aspects of the
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economic system and social structure of Chinese socialism that act
systematically to prevent the desired transformation of workplace
authority relations? The answer to this is by no means clear, despite the
fact that many writers seem comfortable with the assumption that
Chinese economic and organizational innovations can successfully
avoid the Soviet direction of development. While the Chinese have
indeed distanced themselves from many Soviet practices, it is entirely
possible that the patterns of social and economic life embodied in their
alternative approaches may present their own distinctive barriers to
participative management. A centrally relevent, yet relatively neglected
avenue of research on industrial organization in China, therefore,
is the country’s form of economic organization, the social groups
characteristic of the economy, and the related patterns of group interests
and conflict. In the following two sections of this essay we will briefly
sketch the broad outlines of one aspect of China’s form of economic
organization, and suggest its relations to patterns of conflict that may
conceivably have acted to undermine participatory organizational
forms.
LABOR ALLOCATION IN CHINA’S MODE
OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
The central objective of development planning in China-a premise
universally shared despite the obviously different approaches to
development forwarded in China at various times-is the effective
mobilization of all material and human resources for the purpose of
rapid, planned capital accumulation. The considerable political conflict
generated in disputes over development policy in China have not been
over this shared objective, but have been over the political implications
of various methods of planning and mobilization and the types of
resources to be maximized (Rawski, 1975).
The aspect of this objective most directly relevant to industrial
organization is the problem of establishing, in the absence of market
mechanisms, a system of wages and welfare for industrial workers and
rational patterns of allocating these workers to firms when and where
needed. While the forms of economic organization established to
achieve these ends serve as a means to attain rapid industrial growth,
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they simultaneously form the basis of social groupings and group
interests among the workers experiencing these economic patterns. The
specific nature of the developmental problem faced, then, can lead to
distinctive approaches to economic organization, and these distinctive
approaches have an impact on the shape of social conflict.
Few scholars have done more to trace the interconnections between
the specific problems of labor organization facing China’s development
and the unique forms of economic organization applied to these
problems than the economist Howe (1971a, 1971b, 1973, 1974). Even
into the late 1950s, Howe argues, China’s wage and employment
structure was riddled with problems that hindered any sort of planned
economic growth, much less a rapid and equitable one. The periodic
expansions and contractions that characterized China’s economic
development from 1951-1956 not only left a considerable proportion of
the labor force without a means of livelihood during periods of
contraction, but also left China’s industry with acute short-run labor
shortages during periods of expansion (Howe, 1971a: 74-83). Un-
controlled migration into the cities, further, almost doubled the
unemployment problem by 1958. Dependents of migrating workers
formed a large percentage of this population influx (Howe, 1971a: 41-
73). China’s wage and employment structure, in short, had failed not
only to maintain a stable livelihood for a significant part of the
population and provide flexibly for the labor needs of industry-the
whole structure encouraged a relative urban overpopulation of poor,
underemployed laborers. China needed a reformed wage and
employment system that could efficiently allocate the labor supply,
alleviate under- and unemployment, and discourage rural-urban
migration, while at the same time gradually eliminating the material
inequities of life in the city and countryside (Howe, 1973: 107-144).
A series of planning decisions after 1958 gradually altered China’s
wage and employment system to meet these needs. Labor would
henceforth be allocated through a decentralized system of local
contracts, increases in urban industrial wages would be restricted-in
part to remove incentives for rural-urban migration-and, perhaps
most significantly, industry would come increasingly to rely upon a
nonpermanent sector of the labor force as part of a more flexible and
efficient labor system (Howe, 1971: 144, 1973: 107-108; 127-129). This
nonpermanent labor would come from two sources: &dquo;contract laborers&dquo;
would be procured through an agreement with local communes
specifying duration of work and levels of pay, and &dquo;temporary labor&dquo;
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would be recruited on a more casual basis at neighborhood labor
stations from among the underemployed recent rural migrants
(Hoffmann, 1974: 64-73; White, 1976: 99-101).
This alternative employment structure eased in at least three major
areas the problems that chaotic labor organization had presented to
China’s planned and equitable development. First, labor could be
allocated in a way that met the shifting short-run needs of industry
while at the same time cushioning the effects of fluctuating employment
on the population and easing excess rural-urban migration. The pool of
nonpermanent labor could be tapped at varying rates according to
the labor needs of the economy, thus alleviating the periodic shortages
that faced industry in periods of expanded production. Once released
from employment, contract laborers would return to their home com-
mune, where their welfare would be provided for-and not to a reserve
army of underemployed laborers. This employment system helped
simultaneously to ease the rural-urban migration problem that had so
plagued China’s cities. Marginally employed laborers from the country-
side no longer permanently relocated their families in poorer, urban
neighborhoods, but now travelled alone to urban areas for a fixed,
temporary period, leaving their families in their local communes where
they would continue to be supported by their commune work-point
income (Hoffmann, 1974; 64-73; Howe, 1971a: 144-150, 1974: 239-241).
This labor system, secondly, allowed for a more efficient use of
wage, welfare, and urban social overhead expenditures, releasing a
larger proportion of the national surplus product for capital accumula-
tion. Wages paid to nonpermanent laborers were not only considerably
lower than those paid to permanent ones, but they were paid only
when such labor was actually needed, thus reducing the costs due to
employment of a redundant permanent labor force during slack periods.
Since this growing nonpermanent proportion of the labor force did
not receive full union and plant benefits and since their families did
not move with them to urban areas but continued to rely on commune
welfare systems, further savings accrued to the national welfare fund
of state-owned industry (Howe, 1973: 127-129).
This emerging labor system, finally, helped remove those differentials
in income and status between urban and rural areas whose eradication
was a major objective of Maoist development policy. Contract laborers
not only received a higher cash wage than they would on normal com-
mune work but a proportion of this wage was paid to the production
brigade for collective distribution at the end of the year. In an aggregate
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sense, an increasing proportion of industrial cash income was thus
being diverted to the rural population surrounding metropolitan
centers. Permanent workers who were being slowly transferred to
inland and rural areas as part of the increasing implementation of this
labor system contributed skills that were scarce but in great demand
in less developed areas of China. Former contract workers would
similarly aid this geographical diffusion of industrial skills by putting
their rudimentary mechanical abilities to use in their home commune
(Hoffmann, 1974: 74-87; White, 1976).
There were, therefore, compelling reasons-both political and
pragmatic-to further extend this new wage and employment structure.
This dual impetus was responsible for the rapid extension of the system
to the point where, by the mid-1960s, according to Howe’s estimates,
nonpermanent laborers constituted 30% to 40% of the total nonagricul-
tural labor force (Howe, 1974: 235). Several studies have stressed
this shifting wage and employment structure as a source of political
conflict in China (Oksenberg, 1968; Walder, 1978; White, 1976; Wylie,
1977). The possible constraining effects that the conflict accompanying
this shift in employment patterns might have had on attempts at organi-
zational change in industry, however, have been relatively unexplored.
FORMS OF GROUP CONFLICT IN CHINESE INDUSTRY
While conflict has figured importantly in some accounts of organiza-
tional change in Chinese industry, these patterns of conflict have rarely
been tied to an enduring, systematic set of causes in China’s economy
and social structure. Andors, who treats conflict in considerably more
detail than others in the field, links factory strife to the varying political
experiences of workers in previous campaigns, and to the varying class
backgrounds, skill levels, and political orientations of workers, tech-
nicians, and managers. For Andors, these factors help explain dif-
ferences in political consciousness. Conflict, when it appears, is the
result of workers’ class-conscious resentment of authoritarian methods
of decision-making and the &dquo;officiousness and snobbery&dquo; of factory
leadership (Andors, 1976: 39-42, 1977a: 167-171). Factory strife
is thus the result largely of a basic-level impulse by workers to change
the patterns of authority and power in which they live and work.&dquo; I
The point at issue is whether or not these recurrent conflicts sur-
rounding organizational change reflect underlying tensions due to
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specific characteristics of China’s wage and employment structure,
particularly as it has evolved since 1958. This issue is of no small impor-
tance. If Andors’ emphasis on workers’ presumed political impulses
is correct, such conflict would appear to be absolutely essential to
efforts to push through organizational change, and would at worst be
a temporary barrier to the effectiveness of participatory forms of
organization. If, however, such conflict were tied to underlying charac-
teristics of China’s employment structure, it would continually threaten
to assume directions of its own. This conflict would be quite distinct
from the directed conflict employed to effect organizational changes,
and would tend to persist, despite the implementation of participatory
management. Participatory organizational forms, which would allow
relatively free expression of such grievances and antagonisms, are
precisely those types of arrangements rendered most vulnerable to
the effects of such continuing conflict.
There is considerable evidence that the violent industrial conflict
that broke out during the Cultural Revolution was shaped by precisely
these sorts of underlying characteristics of China’s wage and employ-
ment structure. The practice of employing temporary and contract
labor itself may have been, as Andors (1976: 40) has argued, a relatively
minor political issue, but the broader wage and employment patterns
of which nonpermanent labor was only a part had tangible economic
impact on most sectors of the working population. This broad impact
helped create social pressures that temporarily steered the direction
of the Cultural Revolution towards economic issues and shaped both
the form and intensity of industrial conflict.
Three major laboring groups, all with dissatisfactions directly
attributable to the changing wage and employment structure, emerged
during the Cultural Revolution to gain political redress for their griev-
ances. Contract and temporary laborers had perhaps the most serious
complaints. They received lower wages than their permanent counter-
parts (only part of which they were allowed to keep), were at best
partly covered by union benefits or by the plant welfare fund, were not
eligible for bonuses or awards in emulation competitions, and were not
allowed to sit on factory committees or take time off from work for
political study classes (Hoffmann, 1974: 69-73; White, 1976: 108-114).
Apprentices also worked at levels of pay below the lowest wage grade,
were ineligible for bonuses or piece rates, and were similarly denied
welfare and other fringe benefits equal to those of permanent workers.
They saw opportunities for permanent employment drying up in the
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mid-1960s with the extension of the nonpermanent labor system. The
result was intensified competition for available positions, leading to an
extension of the apprenticeship period and the institution of further,
more rigorous placement exams (Chao, 1960: 103-107; Emerson, 1967:
407-424; Hoffmann, 1974: 68-69).’2 Permanent urban workers who had
’been replaced by nonpermanent laborers and transferred either to
small-scale rural industry or to agricultural production-often involun-
tarily-had suffered a marked cut in pay, lost their union health and
welfare benefits, and were separated from their homes on a long-term
basis (Hoffmann, 1974: 74, 86-87). Each of these groups were among
those most active in political organizing in the initial rebellions against
workplace leadership and in the forwarding of economic demands
(Walder, 1978: 39-46).
While there was a social basis during the 1960s for conflict around
economic issues, there was a similar basis for the destructive factionalism
that beset the workers’ movement. Permanent workers, who were
perhaps already resentful of the threat of encroachment by nonper-
manent labor upon their industrial positions, lost wage income when
agitation by these disaffected groups disrupted normal work routines.
Their wage rates and bonuses were closely tied to the continuing produc-
tivity of their enterprise (Hoffmann, 1967b: 474-477; Oksenberg, 1968:
8-12). It is perhaps not surprising that the subsequently emergent
labor groups who opposed the disaffected &dquo;rebels&dquo; among the workers
were constantly accused of being tied with the labor unions of per-
manent workers (Walder, 1978: 33-36, 45-46). Thus, two factors that
temporarily halted economic life in key industrial areas of China-the
occurrence of violent factionalism among worker groups and the
tendency to forward economic demands-both had observable roots in
China’s shifting wage and employment structure. These developments,
hastily denounced by the Cultural Revolution leadership, necessitated
considerable organizational efforts to redirect and defuse such counter-
productive conflict (Walder, 1978: 47-60).
Neglect of such developments in wage and employment structure can
leave one unequipped to explain the recurring patterns of industrial
conflict in China. Andors’ ( 1977a: 234-235) argument that the widespread
strikes of 1974-1975 were the result of &dquo;perceived inequalities&dquo; due to
the deterioration of participatory management is, for this reason,
singularly unconvincing. Hoffmann, who has paid much closer atten-
tion to wage and employment patterns (Hoffmann, 1967a, 1967b,
1964), forwards a more plausible analysis. Persistent strike activity,
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he argues, is due not to worker desire for greater participation but to
two other possible sources, both related to Maoist wage and employ-
ment structures as they evolved in the 1970s. First is the continued
reliance upon the relatively disadvantaged temporary laborers, whose
condition was unaffected by the reform of the contract system (Hoff-
mann, 1977: 314; Howe, 1974: 246-248). The second, and perhaps most
important factor, stems from the desire to keep the urban-rural wage
gap from widening and the impulse to restrict urban wage differentials.
There had been, as of 1976, no general wage increase since 1956, while
the reforms of 1963 and 1971 yielded only small increases through
automatic wage grade promotion among the lowest paid (Hoffmann,
1977: 314-315; Howe, 1974: 237-241). Widespread strikes, therefore,
could be at least in part due to the dissatisfactions of the majority of
permanent workers who had not enjoyed a wage increase, except
through promotion, for two decades-dissatisfactions for which some
observers find indications as early as the mid-1960s (Howe, 1974: 241).
This hypothesis is partially reinforced by the central theme of study
materials distributed to workers and others during the campaign to
study the &dquo;dictatorship of the proletariat,&dquo; started in the midst of this
period of persistent strike activity. These materials stressed the necessity
to restrict gradually remaining wage differentials in China’s eight-grade
system and warned against the emergence of new &dquo;bourgeois&dquo; groups
among workers at the favorable end of this system of distribution
(Yao, 1975; Zhang, 1975). While explaining the continuing necessity for
the wage freeze at the top half of the grade scale, these materials could
provide an explanation for and ideological condemnation of workers
expressing wage dissatisfactions-as well as a rationale for exercising
the dictatorship of the proletariat over this sector of the working class.
Such patterns of conflict in Chinese industry, tied to specific charac-
teristics of China’s socioeconomic structure, can affect the motivation
of large blocs of the labor force and disrupt systems of organization
that depend on the committed participation of workers. Given the
potentially crucial importance of the nature and level of conflict in
China’s industrial system, it would be particularly short-sighted to




Theoretical efforts in studies of Chinese industrial organization have
been directed primarily towards a debate, on the one hand, over
competing abstract notions of the motivation and productivity of
individual workers and, on the other hand, over some rather global
assertions about the dictates of modernization and their impact on
industrial organization. This preoccupation with debating theoretical
assumptions has benefited the field by exposing the inadequacy of some
of the more categorical rejections of Chinese approaches as inherently
irrational. But it has at the same time limited the field to a rather narrow,
and sometimes oversimplified understanding of the theoretical issues at
hand. A recognition of the fact that participatory management can lead
to heightened worker motivation in no way assures either individual
productivity or organizational effectiveness. A rejection, further, of
some of the more simplistic notions of the impact of modernization does
not rule out the possibility that more complex social structural processes
may act to restrict directed organizational change in Chinese industry.
Evaluating the competing positions put forward about the Chinese
experience has required us to work our way through a labyrinth of issues
about worker motivation, the impact of technology, and the process of
modernization. Claims made about the positive effects of participation
on worker motivation and productivity must be qualified by an
understanding that these participatory forms of organization are carried
out under widely varying enterprise conditions. A specific type and
degree of worker input would have a different level of effectiveness, for
example, in a small handicraft enterprise than it would in a large steel
complex. The degree to which the Chinese are successful in making the
necessary adjustments in their overall policy so that it fits varying
enterprise conditions would be an important determinant of the overall
success of the scheme. Recognizing this relationship between
technological conditions and the effectiveness of specific forms of
organization, however, in no way locks us into a vision of technological
imperatives. Claims that increasing technological complexity demands
decreased worker authority have not been supported by a detailed
examination of the specialist literature. Technology poses an essentially
short-run administrative problem for the Chinese: one of innovation
and adjustment. This is quite a different problem than the oft-asserted
global dictates of technology.
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Any understanding of these aspects internal to an enterprise must be
tempered with a view of the larger social structure within which this
organized activity takes place. Two major positions on the broader
social process of development in China have been forwarded. The first is
the blanket assertion that modernization is an inherent process of
differentiation and specialization that rules out the types of changes
attempted by the Chinese. The second is a counterassertion that the
form of socialist development pursued in China is compatible with
radically different forms of authority relations in industry. We have
proposed an alternative perspective: there are no dictates placed upon
workplace authority by the process of development except those
traceable to the specific features of the social and economic system in
which industrialization takes place. It thus becomes an open question
whether China’s socioeconomic system is compatible with different
forms of workplace authority. Investigating the distinctive features
of China’s contemporary socioeconomic system becomes, in this
perspective, a prime area of interest.
One such characteristic of China’s broader social structure in the
process of development that might have a decisive long-run impact on
the success of participatory industrial organization is the pattern of
social groupings and conflict spawned by China’s wage and employment
structure. This is, in a sense, a view of worker motivation from an
entirely different perspective. Here motivation is not a theoretical issue
of the asserted needs of abstract individuals, but a concrete problem of
demonstrable grievances of groups of individuals tied into particular
positions in a changing social structure. The persistence and strength
of such social groups, grievances, and conflicts can conceivably act to
undermine participatory forms of organization. Such conflict would
create pressures for forms of industrial organization designed to control
the effects of conflict by moving decision-making progressively out of
the hands of conflicting or dissatisfied groups.
The ultimate resolution of the complex of theoretical issues sur-
rounding Chinese attempts at organizational change, if ever forth-
coming, is not yet in sight, because these issues are basic ones in con-
temporary social science. Among those of us gnawing at the edges of
these issues in our study of attempts at directed change in contemporary
Chinese society, care must be taken that we do not, en route, become
satisfied merely with rebutting some of the more oversimplified propo-
sitions offered as peremptory solutions to these difficult problems. It is
indispensable to come to ever more precise formulations of the prob-
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lem, progressively more complex ways of asking questions about these
issues, and more systematic and concrete ways of garnering plausible
evidence for our propositions from the scanty and crude sorts of infor-
mation available to us. Only through such a difficult process can we
derive insight from social processes in China that might help us better
understand the structure of human society.
NOTES
1. It should be evident from the foregoing discussion that any attempt to undermine
the Weberian position by criticizing its allegedly implicit Hobbesian conception of human
nature misses the points most essential to Weber’s critique of Marx (Andors, 1974a).
Weber’s arguments are founded not on a conception of self-seeking human nature but
on his interpretation of the historical rise of markets, money economies, and rational
economic calculation and their impact on social relations. The centrality of the problem
powerfully highlighted by Weber is evidenced in the attempt by Charles Bettelheim (1975)
to resolve within a Marxian framework the problem posed by economic coordination in a
socialist economy. Bettelheim’s is a fascinating, if incomplete, attempt to effect a theo-
retical reconciliation between rational economic calculation and the authority relations
prescribed by many Marxian socialists.
2. This correlation between social theory and political sentiments is, of course, far
easier to detect and far less controversial in historical periods other than our own, where
specific ideas can be seen to rise, evolve, and fall with particular civilizations or social
classes. Few today would have difficulty recognizing the element of ideology in the
various theories of divine delegation of a natural social hierarchy among classes in feudal
European society (Huizinga, 1954: 56-67). Nor would many fail to grasp corresponding
elements in theories of race relations forwarded while the American South harbored a
slave plantation economy (Genovese, 1967: 28-36). For the present or recent past, how-
ever, this distinction becomes much more difficult to specify and infinitely more contro-
versial. Harvey (1974) has sensitively portrayed this difficulty in his analysis of the theories
of the nineteenth-century political economists Ricardo and Malthus and their implica-
tions for modern population theory. MacPherson (1964), in a like manner, has pene-
tratingly traced the interrelations between the development of the liberal political theories
of Hobbes, Harrington, and Locke and the development of the market economy of early
capitalism in their corner of Europe.
3. The fact that an idea has clearly observable social or political roots does not neces-
sarily mean that it is completely wrong. Sorting out these claims is a separate, and no less
important task.
4. This account aims to summarize only that stream of theory within Chinese
Marxist discourse responsible for the organizational experiments at issue here. There are
at least two distinct theoretical positions about the organization of production in a social-
ist economy-both with attendant practical policies-that have competed continuously
with one another since 1958. A review article in an edition of Jingji yanjiu from the early
1960s, when these issues were thoroughly and openly debated (Zheng, 1963), serves as an
invaluable summary and introduction to these competing views.
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5. Skinner and Wmckler might possibly feel that in modern industry such structural
factors as technology and environment of an organization might loom more important
than they do in agriculture-despite the fact that Etziom (1975: 484-494) himself views
their work as having general applicability. While aware of this possibility, we will for
illustrative purposes discuss their theory as a general approach to the study of organ-
izational change applicable to Chinese industry.
6. These relationships are further complicated by the finding that the degree of
fragmentation of job tasks influences the way people perceive their relations with others
participating in the task and thus can indirectly be a crucial factor in motivation towards
group goals (Breer and Locke, 1965). While individuals may vary in needs and abilities,
and while they may respond differently to a specific task, a person does in some sense
create these attitudes and needs in the midst of performing the task itself. The concept of
motivation itself is as elusive as attempts to motivate workers are complex.
7. This line of argument has been anticipated by Whyte (1974b: 224-225), who, in
criticizing the tendency of many China specialists to see issues of social and organizational
change in terms of human motivation, asserted that structural problems require struc-
tural, not merely motivational solutions.
8. Perrow, for example, states that when one abstracts from "a highly interdepend-
ent and complex social system," "strategies of analysis" often appear to be assertions
about reality. Technology is the starting point, or "independent variable" in his analysis,
however, only because it helps him to analyze a specific problem-technology, he notes,
is itself shaped by the social system (Perrow, 1967: 195).
9. The assumptions made by Lewis and Lowenthal about the inherent characteristics
of modernization have a lineage which can be traced directly back to Parsonian func-
tionalism through the subfield of "political development." The direct link of this subfield
with functionalist theory was clearest in its earliest seminal writings (Almond, 1960;
Apter, 1965). Later, explicit references to its functionalist forebears became rare as these
generalizations about the process of industrialization became part of the groundwork of
unstated assumptions on which research was based. This accounts for the fact that Lewis
and Lowenthal, who were writing within this subtradition, found it unnecessary even to
defend their theoretical perspective, much less explicitly articulate it.
The link between functionalist propositions and the type of technological perspective
forwarded by Kerr is found in Hoselitz (1963). While outside the political development
field, Kerr’s analysis supports its presuppositions.
10. Compare Baum’s attempt to sort out these issues to that of Whyte (1974a), who
consciously avoids an argument based on the presumed imperatives of technology.
11. Andors’ approach to conflict bears a striking similarity to that of Dahrendorf
(1959), who similarly stresses the differential distribution of authority in the abstract as a
prime mover of conflicting social groups. Dahrendorf is often criticized for obscuring
the links between conflict and concrete notions of class and material interest (Giddens,
1975: 53-59).
12. There appears to have been an intensified competition for available positions in
the mid-1960s not only for apprentices but also for graduating middle school students,
who were innundating colleges with applications for admission as well This dynamic of
competition and conflict surrounding labor allocation in China thus has an important
demographic aspect-the size of successive birth cohorts entering the labor force. These
developments were also the impetus for the initial campaigns to relocate this surplus of
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middle school graduates in frontier and rural areas. A recent ground-breaking article
by Ivory and Lavely ( 1977) reflects the potential power of an analysis that links demo-
graphic change with labor allocation and development policies.
REFERENCES
ALMOND, G. ( 1960) "A functional approach to comparative politics," pp. 3-64 in
G. Almond and J. Coleman (eds.) The Politics of the Developing Areas. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
ANDORS, S. (1977a) China’s Industrial Revolution: Politics, Planning, and Manage-
ment, 1949 to the Present. New York: Pantheon.
--- [ed.] (1977b) Workers and Workplaces in Revolutionary China. White Plains,
NY: M. E. Sharpe.
&mdash;&mdash;&mdash; (1976) "The dynamics of mass campaigns in Chinese industry." Bull. of Concerned
Asian Scholars 8 (October-December): 37-46.
&mdash;&mdash;&mdash; (1974a) "Hobbes and Weber vs. Marx and Mao: the political economy of de-
centralization in China." Bull. of Concerned Asian Scholars 6 (September-October):
19-34.
&mdash;&mdash;&mdash; ( 1974b) "Factory management and political ambiguity, 1961-63." China Q. 59
(July-September): 435-476
&mdash;&mdash;&mdash; (1969) "Revolution and modernization: man and machine in industrializing
society, the Chinese case," pp. 393-444 in E. Friedman and M. Selden (eds.) America’s
Asia. New York: Pantheon.
APTER, D. (1965) The Politics of Modernization. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.
BAUM, R. (1975) "Technology, economic organization, and social change: Maoism and
the Chinese industrial revolution," pp. 131-191 in German Association for East Asian
Studies (ed.) China in the Seventies. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrossowitz.
BENDIX, R. (1956) Work and Authonty in Industry. New York: John Wiley.
BENNIS, W. (1966) Changing Organizations. New York: McGraw-Hill.
BETTELHEIM, C. (1975) Economic Calculation and Forms of Property. New York:
Monthly Review.
--- (1974) Cultural Revolution and Industrial Organization in China New York:
Monthly Review.
BLACK, C. (1966) The Dynamics of Modernization. New York: Harper and Row.
BLAUNER, R. (1964) Alienation and Freedom: The Factory Worker and His Industry.
Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.
BRAVERMAN, H. (1974) Labor and Monopoly Capital. New York: Monthly Review.
BREER, P. and E. LOCKE ( 1965) Task Experience as a Source of Attitudes. Homewood,
IL: Dorsey.
BRUGGER, W. (1976) Democracy and Organization in the Chinese Industrial Enter-
prise, 1948-53. London: Cambridge Univ. Press.
BURNS, T. and G. M. STALKER (1966) The Management of Innovation London:
Tavistock.
CHAO KUO-CHUN (1960) Economic Planning and Organization in Mainland China,
vol. 2. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Center for East Asian Studies.
269
DAHRENDORF, R. (1959) Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford,
CA: Stanford Univ. Press.
EMERSON, J. (1967) "Employment m mainland China: problems and prospects,"
pp. 407-469 in Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, An Economic Profile of
Mainland China. Washington, DC: U.S. Govt. Printing Office.
ENGELS, F. (1973) The Condition of the Working-Class in England. Moscow: Progress.
ETZIONI, A. (1975) A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations. New York:
Free Press.
FOSTER, J. (1974) Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution. London: Weidenfeld
and Nicolson.
GENOVESE, E. (1967) The Political Economy of Slavery. New York: Vintage.
GIDDENS, A. (1975) The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies. New York: Harper
and Row.
&mdash;&mdash;&mdash; (1971) Capitalism and Modern Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
Univ. Press.
GOULDNER, A. (1954) Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy. New York: Free Press.
HAMMOND, J. L. and B. HAMMOND (1920) The Skilled Labourer, 1760-1832. Lon-
don : Longmans, Green.
HARVEY, D. (1974) "Population, resources, and the ideology of science." Economic
Geography 50 (July). 256-277.
HARVEY, E. (1968) "Technology and the structure of organizations." Amer. Soc. Rev.
33 (April): 247-259.
HOFFMANN, C. (1977) "Worker participation in Chinese factories." Modern China 3
(July): 291-320.
&mdash;&mdash;&mdash; (1974) The Chinese Worker. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press.
--- (1967a) Work Incentive Practices and Policies in the People’s Republic of China,
1953-1965. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press.
&mdash;&mdash;&mdash; (1967b) "Work incentives in Chinese industry and agriculture," pp. 473-498 in
Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, An Economic Profile of Mainland China.
Washington, DC U.S. Govt. Printing Office.
&mdash;&mdash;&mdash; (1964) "Work incentives in Communist China." Industrial Relations 3 (February):
81-97.
HOSELITZ, B. F. (1963) "Main concepts in the analysis of the social implications of
technical change," pp. 11-29 in B. F. Hoselitz and W. E. Moore (eds.) Industrialization
and Society. New York: UNESCO-Mouton.
HOWE, C. (1974) "Labour organisation and incentives in industry, before and after the
Cultural Revolution," pp 233-256 in S. Schram (ed.), Authority, Participation, and
Cultural Change in China. London: Cambridge Univ. Press.
&mdash;&mdash;&mdash; (1973) Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China, 1919-1972. London:
Cambridge Univ Press.
&mdash;&mdash;&mdash; (1971a) Employment and Economic Growth in Urban China, 1949-1957 London:
Cambridge Univ. Press.
&mdash;&mdash;&mdash; (1971b) "The level and structure of employment and the sources of labor supply
in Shanghai, 1949-57," pp. 215-234 in J. W. Lewis (ed.) The City in Communist China.
Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press.
HUIZINGA, J. (1954) The Waning of the Middle Ages. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
HULIN, C. and M. BLOOD (1968) "Job enlargement, individual differences, and worker
responses." Psych. Bull. 69 (January): 41-55.
270
IVORY, P. E. and W. R. LAVELY (1977) "Rustication, demographic change, and devel-
opment in Shanghai." Asian Survey 17 (May): 440-455.
KERR, C., J. DUNLOP, F. HARBISON, and C. MYERS (1960) Industrialism and
Industrial Man. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press.
LAW LER, E. E., III (1973) Motivation in Work Organizations. Monterey, CA: Brooks-
Cole.
LAWRENCE, P. and J. LORSCH (1967) Organization and Environment. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard Univ. Press.
LEIBENSTEIN, H. (1966) "Allocative efficiency vs. ’x-efficiency’," Amer. Economic
Rev. 56 (June): 392-415.
LEVY, M. J., Jr. (1966) Modernization and the Structure of Societies. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton Univ. Press.
LEWIS, J. W. (1969) "The social limits of politically induced change," pp. 1-33 in C. Morse
(ed.), Modernization by Design. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press.
LITWAK, E. (1961) "Models of bureaucracy which permit conflict." Amer. J. of Soc. 67
(September): 177-184.
LOWENTHAL, R. (1970) "Development vs. utopia in communist policy," pp. 33-116
in C. Johnson (ed.) Change in Communist Systems. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ.
Press.
MACPHERSON, C. B. (1964) The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes
to Locke. London: Oxford Univ. Press.
MAO ZE-DONG (1961-1962) "Sulian ’Zhengzhi Jingjixue’ dushu biji (Reading notes on
the Soviet Union’s ’Political Economy’)," pp. 319-399 in Mao Ze-dong Sixiang
Wansui. (1969 edition)
MARX, K. (1973) Grundrisse. New York: Vintage.
&mdash;&mdash;&mdash; (1967) Capital, vol. 3. New York: International.
&mdash;&mdash;&mdash; (1904) A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Chicago: Charles
H. Kerr.
MUNRO, D. J. (1974) "The Chinese view of ’alienation’." China Q. 59 (July/September):
580-582.
NEE, V. (1975) "Revolution and bureaucracy: Shanghai in the Cultural Revolution,"
pp. 322-414 in J. Peck and V. Nee (eds.) China’s Uninterrupted Revolution. New
York: Pantheon.
NISBET, R. (1969) Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Devel-
opment. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
OKSENBERG, M. (1968) "Occupational groups in Chinese society and the Cultural
Revolution," pp. 1-44 in The Cultural Revolution: 1967 in Review. Michigan papers
in Chinese studies no. 2. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Center for Chinese Studies.
PARSONS, T. (1971) The System of Modern Societies. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall.
&mdash;&mdash;&mdash; (1966) Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice-Hall.
PECK, J. (1975) "Revolution versus modernization and revisionism: a two-front strug-
gle," pp. 57-217 in J. Peck and V. Nee (eds.) China’s Uninterrupted Revolution. New
York: Pantheon.
PERROW, C. (1972) Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay. Glenview, IL: Scott,
Foresman.
271
&mdash;&mdash;&mdash; (1967) "A framework for the comparative analysis of organizations." Amer. Soc.
Rev. 32 (April): 194-208.
POLLARD, S. (1965) The Genesis of Modern Management. London: Edward Arnold.
RAWSKI, T. (1975) "China’s industrial system," pp. 175-198 in Joint Economic Com-
mittee, U.S. Congress, China: A Re-assessment of the Economy. Washington, DC:
U.S. Govt. Printing Office.
RICHMAN, B. (1969) Industrial Society in Communist China. New York: Vintage.
RISKIN, C. (1975a) "Maoism and motivation: work incentives in Chinese industry,"
pp. 415-461 in J. Peck and V. Nee (eds.) China’s Uninterrupted Revolution. New
York: Pantheon.
&mdash;&mdash;&mdash; ( 1975b) "Workers’ incentives in Chinese industry," pp. 199-224 in Joint Economic
Committee, U.S. Congress, China: A Re-assessment of the Economy. Washington,
DC: U.S. Govt. Printing Office.
SCHURMANN, F. (1968) Ideology and Organization m Communist China. Berkeley:
Univ. of California Press.
&mdash;&mdash;&mdash; (1961) "The dialectic in action-vicissitudes in industrial management in China."
Asian Survey 1 (May): 3-18.
&mdash;&mdash;&mdash; (1959) "Organization and response in Communist China." Annals of the Ameri-
can Academy of Political and Social Science 321 (January): 51-61.
SELZNICK, P. (1966) TVA and the Grass Roots. New York: Harper and Row.
&mdash;&mdash;&mdash; (1957) Leadership in Administration. New York: Harper and Row.
SKINNER, G. W. and E. WINCKLER (1969) "Compliance succession in rural Com-
munist China: a cyclical theory," pp. 410-438 in A. Etzioni (ed.) A Sociological Reader
on Complex Organizations. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
SMELSER, N. J. (1968) "Toward a theory of modernization," pp. 125-146 in N. J. Smel-
ser, Essays in Sociological Explanation. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
&mdash;&mdash;&mdash; (1959) Social Change in the Industrial Revolution. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago
Press.
SMITH, A. D. (1973) The Concept of Social Change: A Critique of the Functionalist
Theory of Social Change. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
STINCHCOMBE, A. (1965) "Social structure and organizations," pp. 142-193 in J.
March (ed.) Handbook of Organizations. Chicago: Rand McNally.
&mdash;&mdash;&mdash; (1959) "Bureaucratic and craft administration of production: a comparative
study." Administrative Sci. Q. 4 (September): 168-187.
TAWNEY, R. H. (1926) Religion and the Rise of Capitalism. New York: Harcourt,
Brace.
THOMPSON, E. P. (1966) The Making of the English Working Class. New York:
Vintage.
THOMPSON, J. (1967) Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative
Theory. New York: McGraw-Hill.
TILLY, C. (1975) "Western state-making and theories of political transformation," pp.
601-638 in C. Tilly (ed.) The Formation of National States in Western Europe. Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
TURNER, A. and P. LAWRENCE (1965) Industrial Jobs and the Worker. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard Univ. Press.
VROOM, V. (1964) Work and Motivation. New York: Wiley.
WALDER, A. (1978) Chang Ch’un-ch’iao and Shanghai’s January Revolution. Michigan
Papers in Chinese Studies no. 32. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Center for Chinese
Studies.
272
&mdash;&mdash;&mdash; (1977) "Marxism, Maoism, and social change" (in 2 parts). Modern China 3
(January): 101-118; (April): 125-160.
WEBER, M. (1964) The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New York: Free
Press.
&mdash;&mdash;&mdash; (1958) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. New York: Charles
Scribner.
WHITE, L. T., III (1976) "Workers’ politics in Shanghai." J. Asian Studies 36 (Novem-
ber) : 99-116.
WHYTE, M. K. (1974a) "Iron law versus mass democracy: Weber, Michels, and the
Maoist vision," pp. 37-61 in J. C. Hsiung (ed.) The Logic of ’Maoism’ New York:
Praeger.
&mdash;&mdash;&mdash; (1974b) Small Groups and Political Rituals in China. Berkeley. Univ. of Cali-
fornia Press.
--- (1973) "Bureaucracy and modernization in China: the Maoist critique." Amer.
Soc. Rev. 38 (April): 149-163.
WOODWARD, J. (1965) Industrial Organization: Theory and Practice. London: Oxford
Univ. Press.
WYLIE, R. (1977) "Shanghai dockers in the Cultural Revolution: political goals or
economic desires?" Paper delivered at Contemporary China Institute Conference,
Clare College, Cambridge Univ., July 4-7.
YAO WEN-YUAN (1975) "On the social basis of the Lin Piao anti-party clique." Peking
Rev. 10 (7 March): 5-10.
ZHANG CHUN-QIAO (1975) "On exercising all-round dictatorship over the bourgeoi-
sie." Peking Rev. 14 (4 April): 5-11.
ZHENG KAI (1963) "Wo guo jingjixue jie jinnianlai guanyu shengchanli he shengchan
guanxi wentide taolun." (Discussions in our country’s economic circles in recent
years on the problem of productive forces and production relations) Jingji yanjiu 2
(17 February): 54-59.
Andrew Walder is a graduate student In sociology at the Unrversro of MIchIgan,
where he is studying theories of organization, conflict, and soc ra! change. He is the
author of Chang Ch’un-ch’iao and Shanghai’s January Revolution (1978), a
monograph published by Muhlgan’s Center for Chinese Studies vt hit h erplores
the relationship between elite and mass political wnflu during the Cultural
Revolution.
